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Itri: Maurice Clarett v. National Football League, Inc.: An Analysis of

MAURICE CLARETT V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, INC.1 :
AN ANALYSIS OF CLARETT'S CHALLENGE TO THE
LEGALITY OF THE NFL'S DRAFT ELIGIBILITY RULE UNDER
ANTITRUST LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

Is there a valid reason why Maurice Clarett, "[a]rguably the
best [running back] in the country," was not eligible to enter the
National Football League ("NFL") 2003 rookie draft after his freshman year in college? 2 Maurice Clarett does not think so. 3 In fact,
he is challenging the NFL's draft eligibility rule that prohibits him
from entering the draft. 4 His lawyer, Alan C. Milstein, confidently
stated, "[the rule] will fall when it gets challenged, because of antitrust laws ....
There are no facts in dispute; it's just a matter of if
'5
the rule is lawful.
Each major professional sports league has established its own
eligibility rules by setting standards each athlete must meet to qual1. Complaint of Maurice Clarett, Maurice Clarett v. Nat'l Football League,
Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2003) (No. 03-CV-7441) [hereinafter Clarett Complaint].
2. See 2003 Big 10 Preview: Ohio St Buckeyes, COLLEGEBALLPIcKS.COM, at http://

www.collegeballpicks.com/articles/?a=5 (last visited Mar. 15, 2004) (on file with
author) [hereinafter College Ball Picks] (discussing Clarett's accomplishments); see
also Clarett Complaint, supra note 1, at 23 (stating Clarett rushed for over 1,200
yards and scored 18 touchdowns); NCAA Football Teammates [Slupport Clarett, at
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2003/football/ncaa/09/24/bc.fbc.clarett.teammates.ap/ (Sept. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Teammates] (noting players believe Clarett
is equipped physically and mentally to enter NFL). "Clarett was named to several
2003 pre-season All-American teams, voted the [number one] running back in college football by the Sporting News, named a first-team All-Big Ten pick, and was
named Big Ten Freshman of the Year." Id. But see Gene Wojciechowski, Good to
Go, ESPN THE MAGAZINE, Oct. 16, 2002, available at http://espn.go.com/magazine/vol5no22clarett.html (noting other views that Clarett was not ready to enter
NFL). An NFL personnel director stated, "[e]venjuniors struggle when they come
into the league." Id.; see also Jon Saraceno, Clarett Proves He's Not Ready to Be Pro,
USA TODAY, at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/columnist/saraceno/2003-09-23saracenox.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Not Ready] (discussing
Saraceno's view that Clarett should be in school and should forget about NFL).
3. See Steve Weiberg, Clarett Files Suit Against NFL Draft Rule, USA TODAY, at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/bigten/2003-09-23-Clarettsuitx.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2004) [hereinafter FilingSuit] (discussing Clarett's
challenge regarding NFL draft eligibility rule).
4. See Clarett Complaint, supra note 1.
5. See Neil Schmidt, Clarett Files Suit Against NFL: Buckeye Wants Early-Entry Restriction Waived, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 24, 2003 [hereinafter Clarett Files Suit]
(quoting Milstein's view on NFL draft rule), available at http://www.enquirer.
com/editions/2003/09/24/sptwwwsptcolla.html.
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ify. 6 In professional football, an athlete is eligible to participate in
the professional draft after he has been out of high school for at
least three years. 7 Several commentators agree that the NFL's draft
eligibility rule violates the federal antitrust provisions. 8 These commentators contend that the rule is an unreasonable restraint on

competition for the services of college athletes, and is therefore
illegal. 9
The NFL disagrees with the contention that the draft eligibility
rule is an unreasonable restraint on competition and intends to defend against Clarett's allegations. 10 NFL commissioner, Paul Tagliabue, stated, "the league will fight any underclassman who tries to
overturn the rule."11 Some commentators and experienced players
in the NFL stand by the rule and are certain the rule serves a valuable purpose. 12 Warren Sapp, the star defensive tackle for the former Super Bowl Champion Tampa Bay Buccaneers, entered the
draft after his third year in college and said the value of college
goes beyond the field.13 Sapp also stated it is important that Clarett
6. See generally David G. Kabbes, Note, Professional Sports' Eligibility Rules: Too
Many Players on the Field, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 1233, 1233-34 (1986) (discussing
professional sports eligibility rules and draft procedure).
7. For a discussion of the NFL Constitution and By-Laws, see infranote 65 and
accompanying text.
8. See Nick Cafardo, ClarettSues NFL for Eligibility: Player ChallengingDraft Eligibility Rule, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 2003 [hereinafter Player Challenging Rule]

(quoting Duke University legal expert and professor, Paul Haagen, as saying
Clarett has strong case and NFL will probably have trouble keeping Clarett out of
draft), available at http://www.boston.com/sports/football/articles/2003/09/24/
clarettsues nflforeligibility/. "[A]ny attempt by competitors to restrain competition in the labor market is regarded by the courts with great suspicion." Id. He
further states that, "[u]nless the restraint falls under a limited number of narrow
exceptions, it will be treated as a violation of the antitrust laws." Id.
9. See Filing Suit, supra note 3 (noting Clarett's suit states, "[tuhe rule is a restraint of amateur athletes who were strangers to the collective bargaining
process").
10. See Clarett Complaint, supra note 1 (stating NFL would not let Clarett
enter 2003 draft or any draft prior his senior year); see also Clarett Considers Challenging NFL, VINDICATOR, at http://www.vindy.com/sports/318381701899327.shtml
(last visited Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Considers Challenging] (explaining NFL officials' potential defense of NFL draft rule).
11. See Considers Challenging,supra note 10 (quoting NFL Commissioner).
12. See Ken Bikoff, Commentary, Let Them Play! Let Them Play! Arguments Don't
Hold Up in Clarett Case, PRO FOOTBALL WEEKLY.COM, at http://www.profootball

weekly.com/PFW/Commentary/Columns/2003/bikoff092603.htm (last visited
Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Let Them Play] (noting NFL rule serves many valuable
purposes).
13. SeeJason Cole, Sapp Urges Clarett to 'Get a Clue, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD,
Aug. 26, 2003 [hereinafter Get a Clue] (noting Warren Sapp's comments regarding
validity and importance of NFL rule), available at http://www.onlineathens.com/
stories/082603/dog_20030826055.shtml.
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stay in school and receive an education. 14 He advised Clarett to
"[g]et a clue ...the [draft eligibility] rules have been put in place
15
to help him . . . [t]hey were set up for a specific reason.
The purpose of this Note is to determine whether the NFL's
draft eligibility rule violates antitrust laws. Part II of this Note will
examine the antitrust laws, including the two standards of review
the court uses in analyzing alleged violations, and how these standards apply to professional sports. 16 Part II will also investigate the
application of labor laws, particularly the non-statutory labor exemption, and how it has been applied to professional sports in the
past. 17 In Part III of this Note, the NFL's draft eligibility rule will be
analyzed under antitrust laws and the non-statutory labor exemption to determine the potential outcomes of Clarett's challenge to
the rule. 18 Arguments by the NFL, in support of the rule, and by
Maurice Clarett, in opposition to the rule, will be raised, discussed,
analyzed, and criticized throughout the analysis.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

The Antitrust Laws and Standards of Review

A discussion of the validity of the NFL's draft eligibility rules
must first begin with an overview of modern antitrust laws. Congress instituted the Sherman Act in 1890 to provide a blanket restriction on the restraint of trade.1 9 In order for conduct to be
deemed illegal under this Act: (1) the restraint must affect trade or
commerce among several states, and (2) there must be an agreement that is sufficient to constitute a contract, combination, or conspiracy. 20 As one court suggested, the plain text language of the
14. See id.
15. See id. (quoting Warren Sapp statements urging Clarett to stay in school).
16. For a discussion on the standards of review, see infra notes 25-40 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the non-statutory labor exemption, see infra notes 5258 and accompanying text.
18. For an application of the antitrust laws and the non-statutory labor exemption to the NFL's draft eligibility rule, including possible arguments and the
potential outcomes of Clarett's challenge, see infra notes 70-220 and accompany
ing text.
19. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). The applicable portion of the
statue states, "[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
20. See id.; see also Kabbes, supra note 7, at 1235 (noting § 1 implies every combination restraining trade illegal). See generally Antitrust: An Overview, LEGAL INFO.
INST., at http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/antitrust.html (last visited Mar. 30,
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Sherman Act is problematic if it is given its literal meaning. 2 1 The

22
statute states that "every" contract that restrains trade is unlawful.

Justice Brandeis acknowledged that restraint is "the essence of every
contract[,]" and if the Sherman Act were read literally, it would
"outlaw the entire body of private contract law."'23 Justice Brandeis
further noted that this body of law establishes enforceability of commercial agreements and enables a competitive economy to function
24
effectively.
1.

Illegal Per Se Standard

In response to these interpretations of the plain text of the
Sherman Act, courts have construed the Sherman Act to apply only
to contracts or combinations that amount to an unreasonable restraint on trade. 25 Based on these limitations, the Supreme Court
developed standards for proving the illegality of contracts or combinations under the Act. 26 In the "illegal per se" standard, the Court

declared certain types of business arrangements are so anti-compet27
itive that they violate the antitrust laws, despite their justifications.
The Court defines "illegal per se" practices as those that have a per28
nicious effect on competition and have no redeeming virtue.
2004) (providing brief overview of antitrust laws and links to additional sources
about antitrust law).
21. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)
(stating literal interpretation of Sherman Act too restrictive).
22. See id.
23. See id.; see also Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
Justice Brandeis further noted, "the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot
be determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is
of their very essence." Id.
24. See Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238 (discussing Justice Brandeis's contentions that restraining contracts are needed for competitive, economic function).
25. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 1 (1911) (establishing
Sherman Act should be construed reasonably; only contracts unreasonably restricting competitive conditions are prohibited). Standard Oil had controlled almost
ninety percent of the nation's refining capacity and employed abnormal competitive business practices. See id. at 58-60. The company used tactics, such as business
espionage, to intentionally force competitors out of business. See id.
26. For a discussion of the standards the Supreme Court used to determine
illegality under the Act, see supra notes 25-40 and accompanying text.

27. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (defining illegal
per se standard constructed by court); see also Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392, 392 (1947) (finding tying arrangements were illegal per se); Fashion
Originator's Guild v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941) (holding
group boycotts were illegal per se); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 151 (1940) (declaring price fixing illegal per se); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. 271 (C.A. 6 1898), affid, 175 U.S. 211, 211-16 (1899) (establishing division markets as illegal per se).
28. See N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5.
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These practices are presumed to be unreasonable restraints on
trade and are deemed illegal without economic investigation into
the industry involved in order to determine unreasonableness of a
particular practice at issue. 29 Whenever a court discusses per se violations, it invariably mentions group boycotts and concerted refusals to deal and has held that reasonableness is no defense to the
illegality such conduct. 30
The Court later ruled in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange31 that
under certain circumstances an otherwise per se violation might be
permitted.3 2 This analysis, known as the "Silver Exception," is a
three-part test used to determine whether an exception to the illegal per se standard exists. 33 The Silver Exception provides a narrow

exception to per se illegality if the following three requirements are
met: (1) the industry structure requires self-regulation; (2) the collective action is intended to (a) accomplish an end consistent with a
policy justifying self-regulation, (b) is reasonably related to that
goal, and (c) is no more extensive than necessary; and (3) the association provides procedural safeguards which ensure that the restraint is not arbitrary and which furnish a basis for judicial
review.3 4 If the three-part Silver test is satisfied, it allows the court to
overcome a finding of per se illegality and requires the court to
29. See id.
30. See Fashion Originator's Guild, 312 U.S. at 468 (noting court's refusal to
hear evidence offered for reasonableness); see also Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1959) (reiterating Court's previous holding that
group boycotts could not be justified by allegations of reasonableness). The Court
held that even though action by businessmen did not result in a reduction of opportunities for customers to buy in a competitive market, it was a concerted refusal
to deal and constituted a group boycott in violation of the Sherman Act. See id.; see
also Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat'l BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 124
(8th Cir. 1973) (noting courts restrict per se illegal group boycotts to three categories); LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 230
(1977) (defining classic group boycott). The Fifth Circuit suggested that group
boycotts could be classified into three categories: "(1) horizontal combinations
among traders to exclude direct competitors from the market; or (2) vertical combinations to exclude competitors of some of the members of the combination; or
(3) combinations designed to influence the trade practices of boycott victims
rather than eliminate them as competitors." Worthen Bank, 485 F.2d at 124; see also
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1927) (noting court
held reasonableness of agreed prices was immaterial under an indictment charging combination to fix prices and limit sales in restraint of interstate commerce).
31. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
32. See id.
33. See id. (describing three-part test set forth by court to determine whether
exception to illegal per se standard existed).
34. See id.
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perform another type of analysis, known as the Rule of Reason
3 5
analysis.

2.

Rule of Reason Analysis

The Supreme Court developed a more flexible method of antitrust analysis that weighs the activity's benefit to competition
against its injury to competition. 3 6 The Court held that application
of this standard, known as the "Rule of Reason," should be limited
to an agreement's effect on economic competition only.3 7 The
Court came to this conclusion by reasoning that the goal of the
inquiry "is to form ajudgment about the competitive significance of
the restraint [against trade]; it is not to decide whether a policy
favoring competition is in the public interest or in the interest of
members of an industry. '3 8 In applying the Rule of Reason, courts
must analyze the alleged anti-competitive effect of a restraint
against trade by taking into account several factors.3 9 These factors
include the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons for the impositions of the rule. 40 With a

basic overview of antitrust laws and the standards of review, this
35. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066 (C.D.
Cal. 1971) (holding satisfaction of three-part test would allow court to overcome
finding illegal per se and require Rule of Reason analysis).
36. See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (holding
lengthy inquiry into restraint was needed to determine whether restraint suppresses or destroys competition under Rule of Reason analysis).
37. See Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)
(noting policy considerations should not be taken into account when performing
Rule of Reason analysis, only economic considerations); see also PAUL C. WEILER &
GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAw 136 (1993) (stating Rule of Reason requires
judge to balance agreement's effect on economic competition).
38. ProJ'lEng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
39. See Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238 (asserting relevant factors for deciding anticompetitive effect under Rule of Reason analysis).
40. See id. In the opinion, Justice Brandeis makes a frequently cited statement
regarding the Rule of Reason:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will
save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.
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Note will now examine how courts have applied antitrust laws to
professional sports.
B. Application of Antitrust Laws to Professional Sports
Various facets of professional sports benefit either from complete or partial immunity from potential antitrust actions, depending on the particular sport and activity in question. 4 1 "While
professional sports [other than baseball] remain subject to antitrust
scrutiny, their conduct is often held to less rigorous standards than
42
conventional industries.
1.

Baseball and Antitrust
Since 1922, professional baseball has been granted a complete

exemption from the application of antitrust laws. 43 In FederalBase-

ball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of ProfessionalBaseball
44
the Supreme Court held that the business of baseball inClubs,
volved principally intrastate activities, to which the antitrust laws did
not apply. 45 Although this broad view of the Commerce Clause is
no longer valid, the Court reaffirmed that baseball remains exempt
from potential liability in subsequent decisions. 46 Currently, the
41. See Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust and Sports: Must Competition on the Field Displace Competition in the Marketplace?, 60 TENN. L. REV.263, 263-64 (1993) (discussing
existence, extent of antitrust immunity varies among professional sports). Activities protected from antitrust laws include agreements for the broadcasting of sporting events, mergers of sports leagues, restraint of players' ability to choose freely
the teams they will play for, and restrictions on geographic moves by sports
franchises. See id.
42. Id. at 264. See generally Daniel E. Lazaroff, Antitrust Analysis and Sports
Leagues: Re-examining the Threshold Questions,20 Amiz. ST. L.J. 953 (1988) (discussing
standards applied to professional sports).
43. See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (holding antitrust laws do not apply toward professional baseball because reach extends only toward interstate commerce). The
Court denied the assertion that the National and American Leagues and their
member clubs had conspired to monopolize the business of baseball. See id. at 200.
44. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
45. See id. at 208-09 (reasoning business of professional baseball is purely state
affair, despite fact competitions are arranged across state lines causing spectators
to cross state lines, because not enough change in business's character). The traveling of fans is incidental, it is not the essential thing, and the exhibition, although
made for money, is not commonly called trade or commerce. See id.
46. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972) (offering two principal
reasons why baseball should remain immune under antitrust laws). The first reason is Congress's "positive inaction." Id. The second reason is, although baseball's
exemption from the antitrust laws seems illogical, it was the product of a judicial

creation and is entitled to stare decisis. See id. The court further stated, "[i]f there is
any inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency or illogic of long standing that is to be remedied by the Congress and not by this Court." Id.; see also
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business of professional baseball is protected from antitrust laws by
47
both congressional positive inaction and the rule of stare decisis.
2.

Other ProfessionalSports

Unlike professional baseball, other professional sports are subject to scrutiny under the scope of the antitrust laws. The Supreme
Court has expressly held that the antitrust laws apply to professional
football, 48 professional boxing, 49 and other professional sports. 50
Lower federal courts across the nation have applied antitrust laws to
professional sports as well.51 Analyzing a particular player restraint
under antitrust laws requires examining both the particular rule being challenged and the context of its use in the professional sport
involved.
C.

The Labor Exemption

The labor exemption attempts to reconcile the conflicting
goals of the pro-competitive antitrust laws and the labor laws that
promote the organization of employees into labor unions. 52 EssenToolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (reiterating professional
baseball's exemption from antitrust violations).
47. See Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451 (1957) (discussing reasoning behind exempting baseball under stare decisis). The Court has justified its decision that the business of baseball is outside the scope of antitrust laws
by concluding more harm would be done in overruling Federal Baseball than in
upholding a ruling, which, at best, would be of dubious validity. See id.; see also
Flood, 407 U.S. at 283 (explaining congressional positive inaction). The Court
states that baseball should be immune because Congress was well aware of the
situation and of the general change of case law, in regard to the Commerce
Clause, and has yet to act. See id. Therefore, the congressional acquiescence of the
rule allows the immunity to remain. See id.
48. See Radovich, 352 U.S. at 445 (holding football subject to antitrust laws).
49. See United States v. Int'l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 242
(1955) (holding antitrust laws cover boxing).
50. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282-83 ("Other professional sports operating interstate-football, boxing, basketball, and presumably, hockey and golf - are not so
exempt.").
51. See, e.g., Peto v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 384 F.2d 682, 683 (2d Cir.
1967) (applying antitrust laws to hockey). See generally Deesen v. Prof'l Golfers'
Ass'n of Am., 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966) (applying antitrust laws to golf).
52. See Scott R. Rosner, Must Kobe Come Out and Play? An Analysis of the Legality
of Preventing High School Athletes and College Underclassmen from Entering Professional
Sports Drafts, 8 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 539, 559-63 (1998) (discussing labor exemption principles). See generallyJohn Doe, Collusion in the NFL, COLLEGETERMPAPERS.
cOM, at http://www.collegetermpapers.com/TermPapers/Miscellaneous/Collusion-in-theNFL.shtml (last visited Mar. 30, 2004) (giving background information concerning NLF labor exemption); see also ROBERT C. BERRY, WILLIAM B.
GOULD, IV,

DUSTRIES

& PAUL

D.

STAUDOHAR,

LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS IN-

(1986) (expounding upon labor relations in professional sports).
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53
In
tially, the exemption protects issues important to labor laws.

1914, the Clayton Act created a statutory labor exemption in response to the restraining effects of labor agreements on competition under the Sherman Act of 1890. 5 4

This exemption was

supported with the passage of several pieces of pro-labor legislation. 55 In addition to this statutory exemption, the Supreme Court
proffered general decisions regarding labor issues that laid the
groundwork for non-statutory, judicial exemptions.5 6 These decisions indicated that the Court was concerned with product market
restraints. 57 Additionally, such decisions indicated the Court's general assumption that labor market restraints are immunized from
58
antitrust scrutiny.
D.

Labor Exemption in Professional Sports

The labor exemption has been successfully invoked in recent
cases by sports leagues to halt antitrust attacks on player restraint

53. See Rosner, supra note 52.
54. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000). For a discussion of the Sherman
Act, see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
55. See Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); see also National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) (describing labor law practices Congress
granted). The purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is to promote collective bargaining and to protect certain union or concerted employee activities. See
id. This law provides three basic rights: (1) the right to self-organize, to form,join,
or assist labor organizations; (2) the right to bargain collectively through representatives; and (3) the right to engage in activities for employees' aid or protection
(use pressure tactics). See id.; see also Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (providing same three rights).
56. See Rosner, supra note 52, at 547-48; see also Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622-23 (1975) (holding
concerted agreements between unions and non-labor groups not within statutory
labor exemption); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, 690-91
(1965) (holding labor and management free to reach agreements relating to parties' immediate employment policies when restraint does not lessen competition
amongst business competitors); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657, 660-61 (1965) (holding labor policy did not protect union-employer
agreement, that other parties, not parties to agreement, forced to meet); Allen
Bradley Co. v. Union, 325 U.S. 797, 810 (1945) (holding statutory labor exemption
did not have automatic immunity but rather protected union conduct undertaken
by itself or with other labor groups, but not with non-labor groups).
57. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
58. See Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961) (permitting labor market restraints, such as hiring halls); see also Rosner, supra note 52, at 549 (noting sports

cases involving labor markets and non-economic competitors were arguably restraints immune from antitrust scrutiny).
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rules. 59 In Mackey v. National Football League,60 the Eighth Circuit
developed a test for determining when a restraint is properly incorporated into a collective bargaining agreement, thereby excusing
61
league officials from following provisions within the Sherman Act.
The Mackey court held the labor exemption would be available to
the employer only if each element of the judicially created threeprong test was satisfied. 62 In sum, the court's formulation provides
a shorthand method for striking the balance between the importance of the subject matter to employee interests and its anti-competitive effects. 63 The Mackey three-prong test will be discussed in
detail in Part III of this Note. 64 Before analyzing the NFL's draft
eligibility rule under antitrust law, this Note will briefly review the
rule itself and the controversy its challenge presents.
E. The NFL
The NFL's eligibility rule states that a player is not eligible for
the NFL draft until three college playing seasons have elapsed since
the player's high school graduation. 6 5 The NFL's draft eligibility
rule has become a part of the collective bargaining agreement between NFL team owners and the players' union. 66 This rule is the
59. See generally Robert A. McCormick & Matthew C. McKinnon, Professional
Football'sDraft Eligibility Rule: The Labor Exemption and the Antitrust Laws, 33 EMORY
L.J. 375 (1984) (discussing application of labor exemption doctrine to negotiated
professional sports player restraint systems in professional and NFL draft eligibility
rule particularly); see also Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Collective Bargainingand Competition:
The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963) (discussing application of Sherman Act to union activities).
60. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
61. See id. at 606 (holding under Rule of Reason, challenged rule restrained
players' free marketing ability and therefore did not fall under labor exemption).
62. For a discussion of the three-prong test presented in the Mackey case, see
infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
63. See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 59, at 392 (citing Mackey v. Nat'l
Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976)); see also McCourt v. Cal. Sports,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979) (summing up essence of labor exemption test
created by both decisions).
64. For a discussion of the Mackey test, see infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
65. See NFL CONST. & By-LAws art. XII, § 12.1; art. XIV, § 14.2 (1976). The
NFL Constitution and Bylaws provide in art. XIV, § 14.2: "The only players eligible
to be selected in any Selection Meeting shall be those players who fulfill the eligibility standards prescribed in Article XII, § 12.1 of the Constitution and Bylaws of
the League." Id. Article XII § 12.1 (A) provides, in pertinent part, "no person shall
be eligible to play or selected as a player unless (1) all college eligibility of such a
player has expired; or (2) at least five (5) years shall have elapsed since the player
first entered or attended a recognized junior college, college, or university ....
Id.
66. See Rick Horrow, Clarett and NFL Eligibility: Some Legal, Business Perspectives,
SPORTSLINE.COM, at http://www.cbs.sportsline.com/general/story/6690272 (Sept.
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current subject of controversy between the NFL and Clarett, a foot-

ball player who, under the rule, has been declared ineligible to play
professional football. 6 7 In response to that declaration, Clarett
filed suit against the NFL on September 23, 2003, claiming the draft
rule violates the antitrust laws because it unreasonably restrains athletes from competing in their sport. 68 Defending the rule, the NFL
asserts that the rule promotes competition within the league, does
not violate the antitrust laws, and serves other valuable purposes. 69
III.

ANALYSIS

A. Antitrust Laws and the NFL Draft Eligibility Rule
Many football players are prevented from entering the profes-

sional ranks because they have been declared ineligible for the
draft under the NFL's draft eligibility rules. 70 As a result of collective bargaining agreements, all team owners place this restraint on
athletes. 7 1 In the past, professional athletes in numerous sports
72
have challenged these rules as being illegal under antitrust laws.
Although widely criticized, the NFL's draft eligibility rule has never

30, 2003) [hereinafter Perspectives] (noting "[w]hile not explicitly in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, the NFL believes that the eligibility rule is part of a larger
partnership between the players and management that has allowed for unprecedented stability").
67. For a discussion of Maurice Clarett's claim against the NFL, see supranote
5.
68. See Clarett Complaint, supra note 1; see also Clarett Files Suit, supra note 5.
"The rule is a restraint of amateur athletes who were strangers to the collective
he purpose of the rule is to perpetuate a system whereby
bargaining process... [t]
college football serves as an efficient and free farm system for the NFL by preventing potential players from selling their services to the NFL until they have completed three college seasons." Id.
69. See Clarett Files Suit, supra note 5. "When NFL commissioner Paul Tagliabue was asked earlier this month if the league could win such a suit, he replied:
'My feeling as commissioner is that we have a very strong case and that we'll win
it.'" Id.
70. See Filing Suit, supra note 3 (reporting Maurice Clarett not eligible for NFL
draft).
71. See generally 48A AM.JuR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations §§ 2963-3147 (1994)
(discussing fundamentals of collective bargaining under NLRA between unions
and employers).
72. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1059 (C.D.
Cal. 1971) (noting Spencer Haywood successfully challenged NBA's draft eligibility
rule); see also United States v. Int'l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., et al., 348 U.S. 236,
243-44 (1955) (noting successful challenge against professional boxing's draft eligibility rule); Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1317 (D. Conn.
1977) (describing suit challenging hockey's eligibility rule).
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been challenged until now, and is currently restraining athletes
73
from entering the draft.
The NFL might first contend that when Congress exempted
professional baseball from antitrust laws, it also intended to exempt
professional football.74 Unfortunately for the NFL, the Court in
Radovich v. National FootballLeaguj7 5 explicitly limited the antitrust
76
exemption to professional baseball under the rule of stare decisis.

Radovich further held that Congress did not intend to immunize
professional football from the scope of antitrust laws through congressional positive inaction. 77 In response, the NFL might argue
that with regard to antitrust laws, there is no distinguishing factor
between the conduct of professional football and the conduct of
professional baseball. 78 The NFL might further argue that, in order
73. See Filing Suit, supra note 8 (noting previous, not current, NFL draft eligibility rules). Craig "Ironhead" Heyward petitioned to enter the draft in 1988 when
the NFL mandated a four-year window from the date of the high school graduating
class. See id. He petitioned because he was a fourth-year junior and the NFL allowed him to enter the draft, where he was drafted in the first round. See id. Barry
Sanders became the first "true" junior to be granted an exception to the rule in
1989. See id. Sanders did not ask the NFL to change its policy, but rather for
"special permission" to be eligible, which the NFL granted. See id. The NFL Commissioner, Paul Tagliabue, changed the NFL rule in 1990 to require passage of
three college seasons after the player's high school graduation for eligibility. See
id.
74. See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof'1 Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922) (holding professional baseball specifically exempt from antitrust laws).
75. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
76. See id. at 451-52. (stating Court found Sherman Act applied to professional football). The Court further stated it would adhere to, but not extend, the
baseball exemption as long as Congress continued to acquiesce. See id. See generally
John A. Gray & Stephen J.K. Walters, Is the NFL an Illegal Monopoly?, 66 U. DET. L.
REv. 5 (1988) (discussing NFL and antitrust laws).
77. See Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957) (finding
Congress' acquiescence regarding professional baseball exemption did not show
intention to exempt professional football). The Court further held Congressional
processes are more accommodating of this type of exemption, and the legislature,
not the court, can exempt other professional sports. See id.; see also United States
v. Int'l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1955) (noting denial of
four separate bills introduced to Congress regarding extending baseball rule to
other sports and exempting organized professional sports from antitrust laws).
The Court noted extensive hearings on the three House bills were conducted by
the Subcommittee of Study of Monopoly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary
and no hearings were held on the Senate bill. See id. At the end of the House
Subcommittee, Congress unanimously opposed the four bills under the reasoning
that such a broad exemption could not be granted without substantially repealing
the antitrust laws. Id.
78. See Radovich, 352 U.S. at 455 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating antitrust
laws applicable to baseball should be equally applicable to professional football);
see also Kabbes, supra note 7, at 1242 (noting Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and
Brennan's dissent from the majority's opinion in Radovich, stating the doctrine of
stare decisis should control Court's decision). The dissenters further noted football
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to eliminate error or discrimination, the Court should include professional football under the umbrella of protection afforded to professional baseball and similarly exempt football from antitrust
laws.

79

For the remainder of this analysis, this Note presumes professional football falls under the scope of antitrust laws. In most cases,
the Court has held player restraint rules in professional sports are
concerted refusals to deal or group boycotts.8 0 Undoubtedly, the
draft eligibility rule is a restraint on competition for college athletes, but is it an unreasonable restraint on competition?8 1 In order
to analyze the legality of the NFL's draft eligibility rule, it is necessary to review past Supreme Court cases dealing with concerted refusals to deal and group boycotts. In analyzing the legality of
eligibility rules under the antitrust laws, courts have varied in their
approaches.8 2 Because it is uncertain which approach a court
would use in analyzing the NFL's rule, this discussion will first examine the rule under the illegal per se approach and then under
83
the Rule of Reason.
and baseball are indistinguishable and Congress did not intend to place baseball in
a class of its own. Id.; cf Int'lBoxing,348 U.S. at 248-50 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(stating "[i]f the intrinsic applicability of the Sherman Law were the issue, no attempt would be made to differentiate" professional baseball from professional boxing). Justice Frankfurter argued the doctrine of stare decisiswas the "imprisonment
of reason" and acts to disregard identical situations in other professional sports.
Id.
79. See Radovich, 352 U.S. at 456 (HarlanJ., dissenting) (stating Court should
leave changes for Congress rather than make untenable distinctions). Justice
Harlan further noted that holding professional football subject to the antitrust
laws makes baseball sui generis in the eyes of the law. See id.
80. See Kapp v. Nat'l Football League, 586 F.2d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding professional football leagues' group boycott of quarterback for refusing to sign
standard player contract was illegal); see also Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439
F. Supp. 1315, 1323 (D. Conn. 1977) (invalidating WHA league rule barring men
under twenty years old from playing professional ice hockey); Denver Rockets v.
All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (holding NBA's draft
eligibility rule illegal because rule constituted concerted refusal dealing or group
boycott).
81. See Geoff Calkins, Clarett Case Should Be Decided on Merit, BEAUFORTGAZETTE.COM, at http://www.beaufortgazette.com/24hour/sports/story/100

7563p-7024639c.html (Sept. 23, 2003) [hereinafter On Merit] ("Even if the exemption doesn't apply, the rule is perfectly reasonable.").
82. See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 59, at 428-29 (stating courts uncertain as to which rule to apply to professional sports cases); see, e.g., Phila. World
Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 503-04 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (applying Rule of Reason approach to sports cases because industry's
unique economic position); All-Pro, 325 F. Supp. at 1066 (applying illegal per se
approach to sports cases).
83. See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 59, at 428-29 (noting uncertainty
regarding which standard court will apply despite modem trend of applying Rule
of Reason).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004

13

316
1.

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 3
[Vol. 11: p. 303
& ENT. LAw JOURNAL

VILLANOVA SPORTS

The NFL's Draft Eligibility Rule Under the Illegal Per Se Approach

In two significant cases addressing the legality of eligibility
rules in professional sports, the court has applied the illegal per se
approach.8 4 First, in Denver Rockets v. All Pro-Management,8 5 Spencer
Haywood challenged the National Basketball Association's (NBA)
rule that prohibited a player from entering the draft until four
years after high school graduation.8 6 The court found that the by-.
laws of the NBA constituted a "group boycott," or a primary concerted refusal to deal, wherein actors at one level of trade pattern
(NBA team members) refused to deal with actors at another level
(those ineligible under the four year rule).87 The court refused to
perform a reasonableness test because it determined that the NBA
could not meet the three requirements of the Silver test.8 8 The
court found the first prong's self-regulation requirement was satisfied, as self-regulation is inherent in the nature of professional
sports leagues. 89 The court further held the second prong's requirement -

that the rules employ the less restrictive means -

was

not satisfied because the rules prohibited players who did not attend college from playing and were overly broad.9 0 Finally, the
NBA did not satisfy the third prong of the test because there was no
84. See Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1315; All-Pro, 325 F. Supp. at 1049.
85. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
86. See id. at 1059 (noting Haywood filed suit enjoining NBA from enforcing
four-year rule, claiming Sherman Act violation).
87. See All-Pro, 325 F. Supp. at 1056 (reasoning NBA bylaws provision prevents
Haywood, qualified professional basketball player, from contracting with any NBA
team). In light of the evidence, the court ruled that the provision was "an arbitrary
and unreasonable restraint upon the rights of Haywood and other potential NBA
players to contract to play for NBA teams until the happening of an event (i.e.,
passage of four years from potential player's high school class graduation) fixed by
the NBA without the consent or agreement of such potential player." Id. See generally Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (defining
group boycott as vertical combination to exclude competitors of some of members
of combination); see e.g., Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1326 (holding rule prohibiting
person under age 20 from playing with professional hockey league member probably per se unlawful boycott); Boris v. Unites States Football League, No. Cv. 834980 LEW (Kx), 1984 WL 894, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984) (holding rule
prohibiting member teams from selecting player unless his college eligibility expired or until it was at least five years after he entered college was per se illegal
group boycott).
88. See All-Pro, 325 F. Supp. at 1064-66 (explaining and applying three-part
Silver test to case); see also Klor's, 359 U.S. at 213-14 (holding financial necessity not
basis for exemption from antitrust laws with regard to group boycotts unless qualified under Silver).
89. See All-Pro, 325 F. Supp. at 1064-66.
90. Id. at 1066 (holding rules overly broad because prohibited signing of players incapable of attending college and players who did not desire to attend
college).
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procedural due process afforded to Haywood; he would never have
the opportunity to present his case to the NBA. 9 1 Based on these
findings, the All-Pro court held that the bylaws violated antitrust laws
92
and were illegal per se.

In Linseman v. World Hockey Association,93 a nineteen-year-old
Canadian hockey player challenged a World Hockey Association
(WHA) regulation prohibiting persons under the age of twenty
from playing professional hockey for any team in the WHA. 94 Linseman claimed the rule was an unreasonable restraint of trade in
violation of the Sherman Act. 95 The court found that this was a
classic case of an illegal per se concerted boycott. 96 Additionally,

the court refused to apply the Rule of Reason because the age re97
striction rule failed to meet any of the Silver requirements.
In both All-Pro and Linseman, the court determined that, on its
face, the contested draft rule was a concerted refusal to deal that
restrained competition in the market for the services of college
players. 98 Unless the draft rule satisfies all three elements of the
Silver Exception, it is deemed illegal per se. 99 With the backdrop of
Linseman and All-Pro, the NFL draft eligibility rule may be analyzed
to determine whether it satisfies the three elements of the Silver
exception.
a.

Satisfying the First Element of the Silver Exception

The first element of the Silver Exception mandates that the industry structure require self-regulation.10 0 In Kapp v. National Foot91. See id.
92. See id.
93. 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D.C. Conn. 1977).
94. See id. at 1317-18 (reviewing facts of case).
95. See id. (stating relevant facts).
96. See id. at 1320 (holding WHA practice was group boycott or concerted
refusal to deal); see also Fashion Originator's Guild v. Fed. Trade Comm., 312 U.S.
457, 468 (1941) (demonstrating concerted refusal to deal has long been consistently classified as per se Sherman Act violation); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (supporting conclusion that refusal to deal is
per se violation).
97. See Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1321-23 (finding case indistinguishable from
All-Pro and relying heavily upon that case during analysis). The court refused to
apply Rule of Reason analysis to the age restriction rule after finding that the restriction met none of the Silver Exception's three requirements. See id.
98. See id.; All-Pro, 325 F. Supp. at 1064-66.
99. See generally McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 59, at 431 (analyzing
labor exemption rule and Silver Exception within professional sports).
100. See Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 349 (1959) (discussing first
Silver Exception element).
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ball League,10 1 the court noted both the U.S. Justice Department
and Congress recognized that professional sports teams need joint
agreements to assure continued viability. 10 2 Professional football requires self-regulation because "the nature of the business requires
rules that enable it to maintain competitive balance and to function
with reasonable efficiency.'1

03

Clarett, an undergraduate declared ineligible to enter the NFL
draft, questioned the NFL's requirement of self-regulation when he
claimed the draft eligibility rule violated antitrust laws. 10 4 Clarett
may argue that the NFL's collective action and self-regulation are
not necessary for a determination of who should be permitted to
play professional football. Clarett may argue that this determina05
tion should be left instead to each individual team.
b.

Satisfying the Second Element of the Silver Exception

The second element of the Silver Exception requires that the
collective action is (a) intended to accomplish an end consistent
with the policy justifying regulation; (b) reasonably related to that
goal; and (c) not more extensive than necessary. 10 6 Essentially, this
101. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
102. See id. at 79-80 (noting need for professional teams to self-regulate isjudicially recognized, despite lack of legislative mandate for self-regulation).
103. See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 59, at 431-32 (arguing self-regulating professional football is justified because business's nature). For example, a
draft is necessary to ensure players are dispersed among teams and to ensure the
wealthiest teams do not receive all of the best players. Id.
104. See Clarett Complaint, supra note 1 (claiming eligibility rule is per se
Sherman Act violation).
105. See Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1321 (D.C.
Conn. 1977) (holding self-regulation in professional hockey not required and
World Hockey Association failed first prong of Silver Exception); see also Wash.
State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pac. Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371, 376 (9th Cir.
1966) (applying illegal per se standard to invalidate regulatory scheme of Bowling
Proprietors Association of America (BPAA), while holding per se rule applied to
non-commercial boycotts). BPAA eligibility rules required tournament bowlers to
restrict their league and tournament bowling to member establishments, to prevent "sandbagging" or including substandard scores to a bowler's average to gain a
larger handicap. See id. The Ninth Circuit held these rules were illegal because
their purpose did not justify the regulation. See id. But see Deesen v. Prof'1 Golfers'
Ass'n of Am., 358 F.2d 165, 171 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding self-regulation required
and restraint not unreasonable). The court approved the PGA's rule permitting
only those approved by the association to participate in PGA sponsored matches,
essentially restraining athletes from competing. See id. at 172. The purpose of the
rule was to ensure that the number of golfers competing in a given match would
not exceed the number of daylight hours available. See id. The purpose of the
PGA's rule was to accomplish this goal, and the court therefore held the PGA's
self-regulation was reasonable and justified. See id.
106. See Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357-61 (1959) (describing
second Silver Exception element).
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element requires the NFL's draft eligibility rule further the goal of
self-regulation.
Much like the NBA's contentions in All-Pro, the NFL will likely
argue that its draft rule is necessary to guarantee each prospective
professional football player is given the opportunity to obtain a college degree prior to commencing his professional career. 10 7 Even
though the policy underlying this argument is commendable, the
court in All-Pro held it is not in a position to decide whether "this
consideration should override the objective of fostering economic
competition which is embodied in antitrust laws."10 8 The All-Pro
court stated that Congress, rather than the courts, should make this
decision.10 9 Clarett might further argue that even if the rule does
serve some relevant goal, it is more broad than necessary because it
applies to all players, including those who do not wish to attend, or
are unable to attend, college.' 1 0
The NFL might also argue that the rule is necessary because it
allows young players to mature physically, mentally, and emotion-

ally before entering the NFL."' Professional football is inherently
107. See, e.g., Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mmgt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1057
(C.D. Cal. 1971) (noting NBA's argument supporting draft eligibility rule and noting professional sports careers are temporary); see also Pat Kirwan, Clarett Should
Stay True to School, NFL.coM, at http://www.nfl.com/news/story/6630186 (Sept.
10, 2003) (stating NFL players who completed college educations were ready move
on to new challenges). "But the players who thought football would last forever or
the big money would hold them over for the rest of their lives, usually found out it
did not." Id.
108. See All-Pro, 325 F. Supp. at 1066 (stating holding).
109. See id.
110. See Clarett Complaint, supra note 1 (stating draft eligibility rule advances
no legitimate purpose and is harmful to competition because it excludes players
notwithstanding their ability to perform, market, and compete for available positions in league); cf Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1936)
(holding summaryjudgment violating antitrust laws was proper where less restrictive means could have been employed).
111. See Len Pasquarelli, NRR - NFL's Demands too Greatfor Prepsters, at http:/
/lists.rollanet.org/pipermail/rampage/Week-of-Mon-20010528/005688.html
(May 30, 2001) [hereinafter Prepsters] (noting several opinions stating NFL has
higher physical demands than other sports). The article quotes the Buffalo Bills
team president and general manager, Tom Donahoe, stating "[a] high school kid
trying to play in the NFL would absolutely get killed... [i]t's simply unthinkable."
Id. Indianapolis Colts coach, Jim Mora, added, "[m]aybe somewhere out there is a
high school kid who can do it. But in all the years I've been doing this, I've never
seen one." Id. Officials were surveyed by SportLine.com and spoke of the obvious
differences between the demands of professional basketball and professional football. See id. The consensus was that the "daily grind of body-to-body contact, with
perhaps thousands of high-speed collisions over the course of a typical NFL season,
made it unlikely a high school player could realistically expect to succeed." Id.
Eric Swann, former league defensive tackle, is one of the few players in recent
times to enter the NFL without college experience. See Prepsters, supra note 111.
Swann played semi-professional football and entered the draft at age 21. See id.
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violent, and participation in the sport can cause devastating injuries. 112 Thus, the NFL may argue that protecting the safety of potential players is an adequate justification for its self-regulating
rule.

113

In response to these contentions, Clarett may argue that the
NFL's rule is overly broad because it eliminates prospective athletes
with the ability to participate professionally in the sport. 114 Clarett
may also argue that the rule is too extensive because the athletic
abilities vary radically among young players and determinations are
therefore too subjective. 115 Additionally, it may be possible to argue that the rule is overly broad because it can deny athletes who
are physically, emotionally, and mentally ready to enter the NFL the
opportunity to play." 6
Finally, the NFL might argue that collegiate athletics provides
an efficient and inexpensive way of training young professional
football players, and that without college athletics, there would be
Swann was the number-one pick of the Arizona Cardinals in 1991 and said he had

felt that the two or three years made a dramatic difference. See id. He was quoted
saying, "[y]ou hear about how a talented guy is the so-called 'man playing among
boys,' but if the NFL let high school players in right out of graduation, it would be
exactly the opposite. It's a big difference, both physically and from a maturity
standpoint, between 18 and 21 years old." Id. Professional football player Herschel Walker was quoted saying, "[y]our body just isn't ready for it and neither is
your mind .... It's a battle every day. A high school player wouldn't get very far."
Id.
112. See McCormick & McKinnon, supranote 59, at 434 n.262 (noting seriousness of violence problem can be best analyzed through injury statistics). For
example:
From 1969-1974[,] .

.

. NFL players suffered an estimated 5,110 injuries.

A follow-up study of serious sports injuries reported that serious football
injuries in 1974 increased 25 percent over the previous season. During
that year, a survey of NFL team trainers revealed that injuries increased to
an estimated record 1,638. That is, 12 injuries for every 10 players.
Id. (citing R. HoRRow, SPORTS VIOLENCE 7-8 (1980) (citation omitted)); see also
NFL Injuries,ESPN, at http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/injuries (last visited Mar. 15,
2004) (noting various, numerous football injuries).
113. See Neeld v. Nat'l Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1979)
(holding rule's purpose was promoting safety, with no anticompetitive intentions).
114. See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 59, at 434 (stating draft rule
aimed at protecting young players was consistent with policy justifying self-regulation). In the rule's present form, it is overly broad because it bars all players without regard to their physical prowess. Id. If there is a concern for a player's safety,
each candidate should undergo an extensive physical examination prior to his eligibility for the draft. See id. at 435.
115. Compare Teammates, supra note 2, with Not Ready, supra note 2 (comparing
two views of Clarett's readiness for NFL and noting subjective and contradicting
views).

116. See College Ball Picks, supra note 2 (reporting Clarett's statistics and honors). But see Not Ready, supra note 2 (stating opinion that Clarett was not physically,
emotionally, or mentally ready for NFL).
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no organized system to pool talented prospects." 1 7 Thus, the NFL's
eligibility rule promotes the efficient operation of the NFL by
strengthening the sport at the college level so that the NFL does
not have to invest as many resources in developing players at the
professional level. 118 Such an argument may justify the rule as financially necessary for the league to continue.1 19 Further, there is
a compelling need for the NFL to maintain good relationships with
colleges because college athletics remain the best resource for discovering talented players. 120 These relationships would be disrupted if the NFL were allowed to draft top players who still had
12 1
years of college eligibility left.
In response, Clarett might argue that if the NFL needs a training ground to develop its players, "the principle of the free market
system dictates that it bear the cost of that need by establishing its
own farm system."'

22

Clarett may reference past decisions that have

rejected similar arguments and have instead held "the anti-trust
123
laws do not admit any exceptions due to economic necessity."'
In order to satisfy the second requirement of the Silver Exception, the NFL would have to demonstrate that the purpose of its
draft eligibility rule is to balance competition among NFL teams by
ensuring a steady flow of talented collegiate players. 124 Thus, the
117. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066 (D.C.
Cal. 1971) (holding NBA's rule justified because argument allows for college athletics to be replaced by farm teams).
118. But see Ned Barnett, Clarett Should Be Allowed Early Entry Trip to the NFL,
NEWSOBSERVER.COM,

at http://newsobserver.com/front/digest/story/2892409p-

2664558c.html (Sept. 24, 2003) (claiming rule has nothing do with preserving college amateurism or any other virtue). Barnett claims the rule is based on the deal
between colleges and NFL, under which colleges "develop the best players for [the
NFL] for free and [in return the NFL will] make sure they have no option but to
play for you for free for at least three years.").
119. Cf Boris v. Unites States Football League, No. Cv. 83-4980 LEW (Kx),
1984 WL 894, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984) (noting USFL's claim cannot enforce
draft eligibility rule, USFL will be financially threatened).
120. See McCormick & McKinnon, supranote 59, at 432-33 (stating practicability is real reason for rule because college players are primary talent source and
necessary for leagues to maintain good relations).
121. See id. at 434.
122. See Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1322 (D.C.
Conn. 1977) (noting antitrust laws do not admit exceptions because of economic
necessity) (citing United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966)).
123. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146 (1966) ("Exclusion of traders from the market by means of combination or conspiracy is so inconsistent with the free-market principles embodied in the Sherman Act that it is not
to be saved by reference to the need for preserving the collaborators' profit margins ....").
124. See Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 349 (1959) (describing first
Silver Exception element).
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NFL would have to prove the rule is reasonably related to the goal,
that it ensures competitive balance of the league, and is no more
extensive than necessary. 12 5 It is unlikely the NFL will be able to
prove that restricting athletes from entering the draft early would
significantly hinder the NFL's ability to spread competition evenly
12 6
among teams.
c.

Satisfying the Third Element of the Silver Exception

The third and final element of the Silver Exception requires
the Association provide procedural safeguards assuring that restraints against trade are not arbitrary and furnish a basis for judicial review.1 27 The NFL's Constitution and Bylaws do not provide
any provision that would satisfy this requirement. 128 The All-Pro
court struck down the NBA's draft eligibility rule because "there
[was] no provision [in the bylaws of the NBA] for even the most
rudimentary hearing before the ...

[draft eligibility rule] ...

[was]

applied to exclude an individual player."1 29 Here, due to the lack
of a provision, the court should conclude the NFL rule falls outside
of the Silver Exception and is subject to the illegal per se rule normally applicable to group boycotts.
In order to satisfy this element, the NFL would have to provide
procedural safeguards that focus on the need for notice and hearing. 1 0 These safeguards would both act as a check against illegitimate self-regulation and provide antitrust courts with a record from
which they could determine whether the self-regulation was justified.13 1 The NFL's present draft eligibility rule acts as a blanket
restriction as to age without any consideration of talent.' 3 2 The
NFL should include procedural safeguards that exclude players
125. See id. at 357-67 (discussing second and third elements of Silver Exception that NFL must establish to gain application of Rule of Reason approach).
126. See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 59, at 433 (noting argument

draft rule necessary to balance competition seems unreasonable when looking at
amount of professional football teams and minimal number of qualified athletes
who can compete professionally before their college eligibility over).
127. See Silver, 373 U.S. 341, 361-67 (discussing third element of exception).

128. For a discussion of the NFL Bylaws, see supra note 65.
129. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066 (D.C.
Cal 1971) (holding NBA rules fall outside Silver Exception because third element
not satisfied).
130. Cf Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1322 (D.C.

Conn. 1977) (comparing professional football's procedural safeguard requirements to professional hockey). The Linseman court held the draft eligibility rule in
professional hockey did not contain procedural safeguards and therefore did not
satisfy the Silver test. See id.

131. See id.
132. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
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only after their skill has been assessed. 133 After analyzing the NFL's
draft eligibility rule under the illegal per se standard, it is now appropriate to examine how the rule would fare if the court were to
adopt the Rule of Reason approach.
2.

The NFL's Draft Eligibility Rule Under the Rule of Reason Approach

It has been suggested that All-Pro would control any suit
brought against the NFL because the NFL's eligibility rule is similar
to the NBA rule invalidated by the All-Pro court.1 3 4 The All-Pro
court only considered the economic effect the rule had on the athlete, such as loss of salary.13 5 In applying the illegal per se approach, the All-Pro court failed to consider other justifications of
the rule that would have been considered had it applied Rule of
Reason analysis.1 3 6 It can be argued that the court erred in adopting the illegal per se standard because it did not consider the rule's
other justifications, and therefore, it erred in finding the rule reduced competition in the league.1 3 7 Thus, in applying Rule of Reason analysis, the Clarett court should consider the NFL's need to
133. See Deesen v. Prof'l Golfers' Ass'n of Am., 358 F.2d 165, 170 (9th Cir.
1966) (holding procedural safeguards established by Professional Golf Association
(PGA) valid). The PGA's rule excluded players only after their skill had been assessed and was therefore valid. See id. The exclusion of a golfer from professional
golf matches based on a number of test rounds and an evaluation from a panel of
judges is valid. See id.
134. See Kabbes, supra note 7, at 1248-49 (discussing application of illegal per
se standard to NFL cases was not dispositive, and suggesting All-Pro case differs
from suits against NFL eligibility rule). Another problem with applying All-Pro's
analysis to football rules is that in All-Pro, Haywood was already playing in the NBA
and had already proven his ability when the rule was challenged. See id. at 1249.
Any challenge to the NFL rule would be from a college undergraduate with little
assurance that he would be able to succeed in the NFL, and therefore, standing
may be lacking. See id.
135. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1061 (C.D.
Cal. 1971) (noting court applied illegal per se standard and only considered
whether rule would harm athletes economically if they were declared ineligible).
136. See Kabbes, supra note 7, at 1249 (suggesting court was correct in finding
that athlete ineligible for draft suffers financially because he cannot receive salary
in college and that Rule of Reason should have been applied to include consideration of other justifications for rule).
137. See id. (noting other factors, such as ability to succeed in league, should
have been considered). Statistics approximate only one percent of college seniors
playing football or basketball succeed in league. See id.; see also Collegiate Student
Protection Act of 1983: Hearingon S. 610 Before Comm. on theJudiciary, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 94 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings] (reporting prepared statement by John L.
Toner, President of NCAA). In stating other purposes of the rule, Toner noted
that the NFL enacted the eligibility rule at the insistence of colleges and universities. See id. Toner further stated that without the rule, recruiting a college athlete
would be difficult for professional teams. See id.
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cooperate with college athletics as a factor demonstrating it's intent
to increase competition rather than restrain it.138
Under the Rule of Reason approach, numerous lower court
decisions have upheld various types of self-regulatory schemes that
have the effect of a group boycott. 139 In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & PrintingCo.,1 40 the Court held that the
illegal per se rule was not applicable without a showing that the
challenged activity was manifestly anti-competitive. 14' In theory,
both the Rule of Reason approach and the illegal per se approach
should reach the same conclusion regarding the legality of the
questioned activity.1 4 2 Because, however, in reality the application
of these two standards can result in very different outcomes, the
court's determination of which rule to apply is critically
43
important.1

138. See Hearings, supra note 137 (noting Toner's advice during Senate
Hearings).
139. See Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (applying Rule of Reason to professional football restraints); see also Mackey v. Nat'l
Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 620 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying Rule of Reason to
professional football restraints). See generally Deesen v. Prof'l Golfer's Ass'n, 358
F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966) (applying Rule of Reason to professional golf restraints);
see also McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 59, at 422-23 (discussing modem
trend of applying Rule of Reason to self-regulatory schemes having effect of boycott). In order to establish guidelines as to when the Rule of Reason and illegal
per se approaches should be applied, Professor Sullivan suggests that only classic
boycotts should be per se violations, whereas other forms of concerted actions
should be analyzed under the Rule of Reason. See id. at 423. Sullivan defines a
classic boycott as that occurring when a group of competitors take a concerted
action aimed at directly depriving their competitors of some essential trade relationship, in order to protect themselves from non-group members. See id. Because
the purpose is clearly anticompetitive, there is no need to perform a lengthy factual analysis, and this is a per se violation. See id. The approach proposed by Professor Sullivan suggests that the purpose and the effect of a restraint should be
analyzed, and, if the purpose is anticompetitive, it should be deemed illegal. See id.
If the purpose is not to restrain competition, but its effect is anticompetitive, it
should be analyzed under the Rule of Reason. See id. (quoting LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 14 (1977)).
140. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
141. See id. (holding unless plaintiff demonstrates defendant possesses market
power or exclusive access to an element necessary for effective competition, courts
should apply Rule of Reason analysis); see also Molinas v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 190
F. Supp. 241, 243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (holding group boycott reasonable and necessary for survival of league because every association needs reasonable governing
rules, and therefore such restraints do not necessarily violate Sherman Act).
142. See Rosner, supra note 52, at 545 (noting disparity in results between application of illegal per se and Rule of Reason standards).
143. See id. at 546.
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In introducing the more flexible Rule of Reason approach, the
144
Court differentiated between vertical and horizontal restraints.
Vertical restraints stimulate inter-brand competition and are subject to the Rule of Reason analysis. 145 Horizontal restraints have no
purpose other than stifling competition and constitute illegal per se
146
violations of the Sherman Act.
In evaluating eligibility rules in professional sports, it can be
argued the Rule of Reason should be applied.1 47 Several factors
must be considered in analyzing the alleged anti-competitive effect
of a restraint: (1) the facts peculiar to the business, (2) the history
of the restraint, and (3) the reason for its imposition. 148 These
three factors should be considered in a Rule of Reason analysis in
order to determine whether the rule has the "net effect" of substan149
tially impeding competition.

144. See id. at 545 (citing Cont'l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,

49-50 (1977) as noting differences between restraints).
145. See Cont'l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-54 (1977) (reflecting view vertical restrictions cannot be completely prohibited because have too
great potential for promoting inter-brand competition). The Court stated, "a
more complete prohibition might severely hamper smaller enterprises resorting to
reasonable methods of meeting the competition of giants and of merchandising
through independent dealers." Id.
146. See id. at 49-50 (holding vertical restraints should be evaluated under
Rule of Reason); cf Smith v. Pro-Football, 593 F.2d 1173, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(applying Rule of Reason to NFL draft eligibility rule). The court did not characterize the draft as an illegal per se violation because it differed from a classic group
boycott in two respects: (1) NFL clubs are not economic competitors in that they
operate as ajoint venture; and (2) NFL clubs do not combine to exclude competitors or potential competitors from their level of the market. Id. at 1178. The court
further noted the per se doctrine should not apply "to concerted refusals that are
not designed to drive out competitors but to achieve some other goal." Id. at 1180.
147. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1181 (holding illegal per se rule was judicial shortcut and should be applied only after considerable experience with particular type
of restraint). The Smith court noted the limited experience courts have had with
draft rules as restraints. See id. Further, courts often know too little of the economics and businesses from which these rules issue to declare them illegal without a
proper analysis. See id. at 1182.
148. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)
(establishing elements considered within Rule of Reason analysis).
149. See Cont'l 7 V., 433 U.S. at 49 (citing Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)). Under the Rule of Reason, "the fact finder weighs all of
the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition." Id. In determining whether a particular commercial practice should be prohibited per se,
"[t]he probability that anticompetitive consequences will result from [the] practice and the severity of those consequences must be balanced against its pro-competitive consequences." Id.
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Considering Facts Peculiar to the Business

First, it is important to consider the facts peculiar to the
NFL.15 0 In professional football, it is essential the teams work together to attain a high level of quality because spectator interest will
be maintained only if teams are "competitively balanced." 151 Unlike most businesses subject to antitrust laws, NFL teams are not
interested in driving out competition; football teams understand
that no one team can survive if the NFL fails. 15 2 Therefore, rules
such as the draft eligibility rule are essential for ensuring a steady
flow of talent and balancing competition among teams. 153 The
NFL could argue that the draft eligibility rule's restraint on players
is reasonable because it protects the league's viability by balancing
competition.
150. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (distinguishing
nature of professional sports from different businesses for several reasons). Judge
MacKinnon notes several important reasons:
(1) professional sports involve economic cooperation instead of competition; (2) the NFL comprises a natural monopoly; (3) a player draft is
simply "natural" for team sports, as all major sports have drafts; (4) the
draft has succeeded in producing a higher level of competition and has
produced a quality product by reducing the ability of certain teams to
dominate the league. Therefore, the draft's pro-competitive effects can
be found to outweigh its anti-competitive effects, and should withstand
the Rule of Reason scrutiny.
Id. at 1191-1222.
151. See id. at 1179 (noting NFL clubs combined in implementing draft not
economic competitors, but rather, operate joint venture for producing entertainment product football games and telecasts); see also Mackey v. Nat'l Football
League, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting 'Joint venture" characteristics of
NFL); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
332 (1978) ("Agreements to refuse to deal are essential to the effectiveness and
sometimes to the existence of many wholly beneficial economic activities. All
league sports . . . rest entirely upon the right to boycott.").

152. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1179 (noting because of joint venture characteristics of NFL, no teams within joint venture can survive without other); see also N.
Am. Soccer League v. Nat'l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1253 (2d Cir. 1982)
("[E] conomic success of each franchise is dependant on the quality of sports competition throughout the league and the economic strength and stability of other
league members.").
153. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1181 (noting some form of player selection system
may serve to regulate and thereby promote competition in what would otherwise
be a chaotic bidding market for service of college players). "[E]vidence showed
that the draft was designed to preserve, and that it made some contribution to
preserving, playing-field equality among NFL-teams with various attendant benefits." Id.; cf Note, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: ProfessionalTeam Sports and the
Antitrust Laws, 81 HARv. L. REv. 418, 419-21 (1967) (supporting NFL's argument
draft balances competition even in professional baseball). Professional baseball
adopted a draft in 1965, after many years of exclusive reliance on its "farm system,"
because the farm system was leading to a competitive imbalance. Id.
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The NFL could also assert that professional football is a business and the draft itself differs from classic group boycotts because
"[t] he NFL clubs have not combined to exclude competitors or potential competitors from their level of the market." 154 Clarett is not

seeking to compete with the NFL clubs, and their refusal to deal
with him has resulted in no substantial impediment to competition. 155 Thus, the draft rules are not designed to insulate the NFL
from competition resulting in a monopoly, but rather to "improve
the entertainment product by enhancing its team's competitive
1

equality."

56

In Smith v. ProFootball, Inc.,15 7 the court stated that evidence on
whether the draft was essential to competitive balance was at best
equivocal and there was no correlation between the NFL draft and
the survival of the league had been shown to exist. 15 8 Clarett may
argue that the impact of the player draft does not serve to equalize
competition in the NFL.1 59 Clarett may further argue that the career of a professional athlete is far more limited than that of a person engaged in most other occupations, thus the loss of one year of
playing time is irreparably harmful. 160 Clarett may suffer irreparable financial and emotional damage as a consequence of thedraft
154. See Keith A. Prettyman, Note, The True Story of What Happens When the Big
Kids Say, "It'sMy football, and You'll EitherPlay by My Rules or You Won't Play at All. ",
55 NEB. L. REv. 335, 344 (1976).
155. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting courts have consistently refused to invoke boycott rule as illegal per se).
156. See id. at 1179, cf. Deesen v. Prof 1 Golfer's Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165, 170 (9th
Cir. 1966) (refusing to invoke boycott per se rule against entry restrictions where
purpose was "not to destroy competition but to foster it by maintaining a high
quality of competition").
157. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
158. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1185-86 (suggesting fact finding reaches no conclusion that draft equalizes competition and noting uncertainty as to effect draft had
on existing competitive balance). The Smith court stated:
More importantly, the defendants were unable to produce any credible
evidence of a significant correlation between the opportunity to draft
early in the draft (i.e. the preferred position) and improvement in team
performance. In fact, the defendants' evidence in this regard indicates a
correlation too low to be regarded as supporting their claim that the draft
is essential to the survival of the league.
Id.
159. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1185 (noting other factors play role in players'
choice of team besides draft). Some other factors include unrelated business opportunities, general community atmosphere, climate, educational opportunities,
and disagreement with coaching staff and/or management. See id.
160. See Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1319 (D.C.
Conn. 1977) (noting professional athlete's loss of one year of playing time can be
detrimental). The Linseman court also acknowledged that the nature of professional sports requires constant practice against the very best competition in order
to finely hone one's skills. See id. The court further noted that by playing in a
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eligibility rule. 16 1 Clarett might demand an injunction to the rule
because there is no adequate monetary compensation for the damage he will suffer from being unable to participate in the NFL
16 2
draft.
b.

Considering the History of the Restraint

An analysis of the NFL eligibility rule under the Rule of Reason
163
requires a review of the history of the NFL draft rule's restraint.
The NFL might contend that the draft rule, enacted at the inception of the NFL, has succeeded in achieving its purposes. 1 64 The
draft was a device intended to allocate player talent evenly and prevent wealthy owners from cornering the market. 165 At the time, the
player draft arguably had some importance in preserving a competitive balance to ensure spectator interest.' 66 Aside from balancing
competition, the rules were also adopted in response to the demands of colleges and universities. 167 The draft eligibility rule enables colleges to retain quality players until their eligibility has
ended, and, in return, professional teams have access to college
professional league, athletes may achieve the status of "superstar," which would
bring them both financial and emotional rewards. See id.
161. Cf Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1057 (C.D.
Cal. 1971) (comparing Haywood's claim against NBA to Clarett's claim against
NFL). The court stated:
[Haywood] will suffer irreparable injury in that a substantial part of his
playing career will have been dissipated, his physical condition, skills and
coordination will deteriorate from lack of high-level competition, his
public acceptance as a super star will diminish to the detriment of his
career, his self-esteem and his pride will have been injured and a great
injury will have been perpetrated on him.
Id.; see also Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1319 (holding hockey player would suffer
injury by not playing in league).
162. See Clarett Complaint, supra note 1; see also Bowman v. Nat'l Football
League, 402 F. Supp. 754, 756 (D. Minn. 1975) (finding potential player's inability
to play in NFL would cause irreparable injury and granting preliminary injunctive
relief).
163. For a discussion on the Rule of Reason, see supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
164. See Kabbes, supra note 7, at 1250.
165. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1185.
166. See id. at 1179 (noting along with television's advent came need for better
and more evenly spread competition and noting draft was enacted to preserve
competitive balance for this purpose).
167. See Kabbes, supra note 7, at 1250 (citing Boris v. Unites States Football
League, No. Cv. 83-4980 LEW (Kx), 1984 WL 894, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984)
as stating NFL and USFL adopted rules responding to demands of colleges and
universities); see also Hearings, supra note 137 (noting NFL commissioner's statements support finding that NFL enacted and follows eligibility rule at insistence of
colleges).
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programs for the purpose of scouting college athletes. 168 The NFL
is not attempting to restrain competition through the adoption of
its rule, but rather it seeks to increase competition while maintaining a good rapport with colleges and universities. 69
c.

Considering the Reasons Underlying the Restraint

The Rule of Reason approach also requires an examination of
the reasons underlying the draft eligibility rule in determining the
rule's legality. 170 The NFL may attempt to justify the draft rule by
asserting it has a legitimate business purpose of promoting "competitive balance."1 71 The player draft rule acts to heighten athletic
competition and to improve the entertainment product offered to
7 2
the public; it is therefore "pro-competitive.'
If the Clarettcourt follows the Smith holding, the NFL's competitive balance argument will not be upheld. The court in Smith declared that the alleged pro-competitive effect of the NFL draft rule
did not increase competition in the economic sense.1 73 Using the
Rule of Reason balancing test, the draft's anti-competitive evils
must be balanced against its pro-competitive virtues. The rule will
only be upheld if the latter outweighs the former. 174 It is uncontested the NFL draft's pro-competitive effects are economically nonexistent. 175 The Court's holding in National Society of ProfessionalEn168. See Kabbes, supra note 7, at 1250 (citing Boris v. Unites States Football
League, No. Cv. 83-4980 LEW (Kx), 1984 WL 894, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984)
as noting recruiting college athletes could be difficult for professional teams without college coach's approval).
169. See id. (USFL's actions within Boris case evidences benefits derived by
college programs from eligibility rules); see also Hearings, supra note 137 (stating
until College Football Association knew .USFL's position on signing college athletes and disregarding eligibility rule, full cooperation with USFL would be "difficult for CFA members"). The College Football Association is a voluntary
organization of 60 universities who sponsor football at major NCAA Division I level
universities. See id.
170. For a discussion of the Rule of Reason, see supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186 (noting NFL argued same principle).
172. See id. (noting draft allegedly exerts pro-competitive effect on playing
field).
173. See id. (reasoning that draft was pro-competitive in different sense from
being anti-competitive). Although the draft is allegedly pro-competitive on the
playing field, it is anti-competitive in the market. See id. The draft "does not increase competition in the economic sense of encouraging others to enter the market and to offer the product at lower cost." Id. "In strict economic terms, the
draft's demonstrated pro-competitive effects are nil." Id.
174. See id. (discussing principle behind Rule of Reason analysis).
175. See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186.
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gineers v. United States176 suggests that businessmen "could notjustify
their restrictive conduct on the basis of some noneconomic benefit."1 77 Under this reasoning, the NFL's competitive balance justifi-

cation likely would not be upheld.
B.

Labor Exemption and the NFL Draft Eligibility Rule

This Note now turns to a consideration of whether the labor
exemption applies to the NFL's draft eligibility rule, removing it
from the scope of antitrust laws. A judicially created labor exemption has been developed to accommodate inherent conflicts between national labor and antitrust policies. 178 The exemption
essentially protects labor-management agreements from antitrust
laws. 179 The NFL claims that the draft eligibility rule is incorporated as part of the collective bargaining contract between the NFL
owners and the players' union.1 8 0 Thus, an argument may be made
that the NFL's rule is protected by national policies that protect
union activities and, ultimately, immunize the NFL draft rule from
antitrust scrutiny.1 8 '
Past decisions applying the non-statutory labor exemption to
sports industry practices are good indicators of the likelihood that
the NFL draft eligibility rule will qualify for exemption. In Mackey
v. National Football League,l8 2 the court devised a three-part test to
determine whether it was appropriate to apply the non-statutory la176. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
177. See id. at 692 (limiting scope of inquiry under Rule of Reason to means
necessary "to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint;
it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or
in the interest of the members of the industry.").
178. See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 59, at 381 (discussing purpose
and formation of labor exemption). See generally Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor
Disputes, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 1283 (1939) (generally discussing labor exemption to
antitrust law).
179. See generally Boudin, supra note 178.
180. But see Clarett Complaint, supra note 1 (stating CBA does not expressly
contain rule).
181. See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 59, at 382 (discussing possibility
labor exemption will exclude NFL draft rule from antitrust laws); see also NFL Collective BargainingAgreement, 10-211 ENT. INDUSTRY CONT. FoRm 211-2, art. I, § 2
(Mar. 1, 1977) (describing collective bargaining agreement between NFL and
NFLPA). The relevant section of the agreement states: "Any provisions of the...
N.F.L. Constitution and Bylaws ... which are not superseded by this Agreement,
will remain in full force and effect for the continued duration of this Agreement
and, where applicable, all players, clubs, the N.F.L.P.A., and the N.F.L., and the
Management Council will be bound thereby." Id.
182. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
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bor exemption.' 8 3 The three requirements are: (1) the restrictions
must affect only the parties to the collective bargaining agreement,
(2) the assailed practice must concern a mandatory subject of bargaining, and (3) the restriction must be a product of bona fide
arm's-length bargaining. 184 The NFL's draft eligibility rule must
satisfy each of the three prongs of the Mackey test in order to avoid
an antitrust violation under the exemption.
1. First Prong of the Mackey Test
Under the first prong of the labor exemption test, the court
must examine whether the draft eligibility rule, as a contract between the players' union and the NFL, effectively restrains players
who were not parties to agreement. 185 Those agreements that restrain players who are not parties to the collective bargaining do
not fall within the labor exemption unless the impact is outweighed
by some vitally important union purpose.18 6 Clarett argues that the
draft is illegal because it affects players outside of the collective bargaining unit and that past court decisions have held these agree87
ments do not qualify under the labor exemption.
183. See id. at 613-14 (noting court employed three-part test in determining
whether non-statutory labor exemption applied to RozelLe Rule presupposing violation of antitrust laws).
184. See id. (discussing three requirements); see also McCourt v. Cal. Sports,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979) (altering third prong of test). The Sixth Circuit
slightly altered the Mackey test. See id. at 1290. In order to satisfy the third prong,
management in that case simply had to show that the union fully participated in
the negotiations leading up to the collective bargaining agreements. See id. at
1201.
185. See Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976)
(discussing first prong of test).
186. See generally United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965) (holding one group of employers may not conspire to eliminate competitors from industry and union is liable with employers if it is party to conspiracy.
The Pennington Court also held that the policy considerations underlying antitrust
law is set against employer-union agreements seeking to prescribe labor standards
outside of the bargaining unit. See id.; see also Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) (holding arrangement effectively precluded non-union subcontractors from competing for jobs constituted restraint on
strangers to relationship and labor exemption was not available); Allen Bradley
Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945) (holding no exemption existed
when unions participated with businessmen who had power to eliminate all competition among themselves and prevent all competition with others, even if purpose was to increase union member wages and employment opportunities).
187. See Clarett Complaint, supra note 1 (claiming rule is restraint on amateur
athletes who are strangers to collective bargaining process between NFL and
NFLPA and asserting restraint does not advance any important union goal); see also
McCormick & McKinnon, supranote 59, at 397 (noting arguments supporting view
that NFL rule should not be granted immunity under labor exemption). The
Note states:
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Collective agreements, however, often affect employees outside
of the bargaining union. 18 8 The NFL may argue that due to the

nature of professional football as a business and of professional
football teams as employers, there must be contractual arrangements tailored to those unusual commercial contexts. 189 One of
the fundamental principles of the labor policy is the NFL players'
union can legally eliminate competition among its players through
a governmentally supervised majority vote by selecting an exclusive
bargaining representative, the players' union. 190 ' The federal labor
policy thus enables the players' union to seek the best deal for the
majority of the existing players through collective, rather than individual, bargaining power. 91 Once the union has been selected, into negotiate
dividual players such as Clarett are not permitted
19 2
directly with teams without the union's consent.
The NFL draft eligibility rule, though it may preserve and prolong employment for current unit members, has, as its direct effect, the restraint
of amateur athletes who as yet are strangers to the bargaining relationship and does not significantly advance any important union goal. Restraining college undergraduates from competing for a position on an
NFL team is in fact the direct object of the agreement between the NFL
and the NFLPA. Like the small mine operators in Pennington, the nonNew York City manufacturers in Allen Bradley, and the non-union subcontractors in Connell, these amateurs - still strangers to the bargaining
relationship - are the direct (and only) object of the restraint. Immunity, therefore, cannot be claimed.
Id.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210-17
188. See, e.g.,
(1964) (noting seniority clauses prevent outsiders from bidding on particularjobs,
while other provisions may regulate allocation of work that favors senior workers).
189. See Wood v Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting college draft needed for business's unique nature).
190. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000). Section
159(a) of the National Labor Relations Act explicitly provides that
"[r]epresentatives... selected ...by the majority of the employees in a unit...
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining." Id.; cf. Wood, 809 F.2d at 959 (holding NBA's
collective agreement was illegal because it prevented plaintiff from achieving his
full-market value and noting that such prevention is at odds with federal labor
policy).
191. See § 159(a).
192. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967) (holding
labor policy extinguishes individual employee's power to order his own relations
with employer and creates power vested in chosen representative to act in interests
of all employees). "National labor policy has been built on the premise that by
pooling their economic strength and acting through a labor organization freely
chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions." Id.; see also Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202
(1944) ("Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers
comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the
rights of those whom it represents.").
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Clarett's complaint asserts that the collective bargaining agreement is illegal because it prohibits him from being a party to the
collective bargaining that restrains him. 193 Clarett's complaint is at
odds with the federal labor policy that delegates unions to represent players. 94 Collective agreements routinely set standards
for all players, and Congress granted the players' union the task of
setting these standards, which prohibit players from individually
bargaining with NFL teams.1 9 5 With regard to the standards set by
the union, the Supreme Court has observed, "[t]he complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected."1 96 To
allow Clarett to individually bargain with NFL teams, despite evidence pointing to his ability to compete at the professional level,
19 7
would be contrary to explicit federal labor policy.

2.

Second Prong of the Mackey Test

The second prong of the Mackey test requires that the draft
eligibility rule be a mandatory subject of bargaining within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in order to
receive antitrust immunity. 198 The NLRA requires employers (NFL
teams) to bargain collectively regarding "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment" with the representative of the
employees (the players' union). 199
193. See Clarett Complaint, supra note 1 (claiming draft eligibility rule's direct
effect is restraint of amateur athletes who were strangers to bargaining process
between NFL and NFLPA).
194. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 94-96
(1957) (holding multi-employer bargaining common practice).
195. Cf Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987) (supporting proposition that individual bargaining is not allowed and interpreting
NLRA as Congress granting authority to union to balance employee interests).
196. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) (noting differences inevitably arise in manner and degree of terms of any negotiated agreement
that affect individual employees and classes of employees).
197. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000) (establishing
employee representative as exclusive representative for purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment); see also Wood, 809 F.2d at 960 (noting if plaintiff's theory
that he should be able to individually bargain with NBA is permitted, then any
dissatisfied employee could insist on individual bargaining, contrary to explicit labor policy).
198. See Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976)
(discussing second prong of test).
199. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000). The statute
defines "bargain collectively" as "the performance of the mutual obligation of the
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment ...." Id. at § 158(a)(5). Section 158(a) (5) provides that it is an
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Clarett may argue that the NFL's draft eligibility rule is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining for two reasons. First, amateur
athletes like Clarett are not employees to whom the employer's obligation flows. 20 0 Second, the subject matter itself, employment eli-

gibility, is not within the definition20 1of the terms and conditions of
employment set out in the NLRA.
a.

Amateur Athletes as "Employees" Under the NLRA

Clarett may argue that a narrow interpretation of "employee"
should apply and that college undergraduates are not "employees"
within the meaning of the NLRA. 20 2 Clarett might use the holding
in Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,203
which held that a union only represents employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.2 0 4 Furthermore, the NLRA rule limits this ap-

interest,"
propriate unit to employees who share a "community
thereby excluding people outside that community whose interests
20 5 Clarett
would be submerged in an over-inclusive grouping.

unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a)." Id.
200. See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 59, at 401 (discussing why draft
eligibility rule is not mandatory bargaining subject).
201. See Clarett Complaint, supra note 1 (claiming rule does not concern
wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment and is thus not
mandatory subject of bargaining within meaning of NLRA).
202. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 165 (1971) (addressing term "employee"). The Court
determined that the definition of "employee" should not be stretched beyond its
plain meaning, which included those who worked for another, by looking at the
legislative history of the Taft-Harley Act. Id. at 166; see also McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 59, at 404 (stating because college undergraduates could neither
be included in bargaining unit with active players nor vote for selection of bargaining representative, duty to bargain on their terms and conditions of employment
does not attach).
203. 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
204. See id. at 172 (declaring retirees are not "employees" within meaning of
collective bargaining).
205. See ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 379 (1976) (listing
factors considered in determining whether community interest exists). To determine whether a "community of interest" exists among groups of employees, the
Board examines the following factors:
(1) similarity in the scale and manner of determining earnings; (2) similarity in employment benefits, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; (3) similarity in kind of work performed; (4)
similarity in the qualifications, skills and training of the employees; (5)
frequency of contact or interchange among employees; (6) geographic
proximity; (7) continuity or integration of production processes; (8)
common supervision and determination of labor-relations policy; (9) relationship to the administrative organization of the employer; (10) history of collective bargaining; (11) desires of the affected employees; (12)
extent of union organization.
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could argue that with regard to the eligibility rule that bars his entry
into professional football, his interest is in opposition to the interests of active players. 20 6 Under this reasoning, because Clarett's interests are not represented, he would not be included in the
bargaining unit with active players and would therefore not be considered an "employee" within the meaning of the NLRA.
On the other hand, the NFL may argue that the NLRA explicitly defines "employee" in a way that includes workers outside of the
bargaining unit.2 07 The NFL could also argue that because courts

have ruled that job applicants are "employees" within the meaning
of the Act, prospective NFL players should similarly be considered
employees for this purpose. 208 Furthermore, if Clarett's claim were
to succeed, the federal labor policy would collapse because commonplace arrangements would be subject to similar challenges unless the judge constructed an exception for professional athletes. 20 9
b.

Employment Eligibility as Mandatory Subject of Bargaining
Under the NLRA

Clarett may further argue that the draft eligibility rule is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining under the NLRA and therefore
2
fails the second prong of the judge-made labor exemption test.

10

The NLRA does not list the subjects that fall within the statutory
requirement, despite the fact that the subjects within the requirement settle an aspect of the employee-employer relationship.2 11 In
Id.
206. See Jay Glazer, Game-Day Notebook: Ball Gets Rolling on Clarett Challenge,
at http://cbs.sportsline.com/nfl/story/6639875 (Sept. 14, 2003)
("There had been talk of him transferring... but Clarett now appears like the only
place he wants to play next year is the NFL.").
207. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000). The definition provides, in pertinent part: "[tihe term employee shall include any employee,
and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this
subchapter explicitly states otherwise." Id.
208. See Time-O-Matic, Inc. v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1959) (holding
job applicants were employees under 29 U.S.C. § 152(3));John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (holding term "employee"
included applicants as well as existing employees).
209. See Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting if antitrust claim succeeded and employees were allowed to individually bargain, employers would have no assurance they could enter into collective
agreements without exposing themselves to action for treble damages).
210. See Clarett Complaint, supra note 1 (asserting draft eligibility rule is not
mandatory collective bargaining subject); see also McCormick & McKinnon, supra
note 59, at 405 (claiming draft eligibility restraint not mandatory bargaining
subject).
211. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 ("In general terms, the limitation [in
SPORTSLINE.COM,
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cases where an exception to this rule has been made, the exception
has been based on a finding that the subject affects parties outside
the relationship and the issue "vitally" affects the employment terms
and conditions of the employee.2 12 In this case, the "draft eligibility
rule erects an artificial .obstacle to employment for amateur athletes
that incidentally benefits marginal players whose place on team rosters would be threatened by the rule's abolition," and does not "vitally" affect the terms and conditions of employment. 213 Clarett
may argue that because the rule places an unreasonable restraint
on prospective players outside the collective bargaining unit without "vitally" affecting active players represented by the union, it fails
the second prong of the Mackey test and should not be immunized
from the antitrust laws.
In response to this argument, the NFL may argue that the draft
eligibility rule is a mandatory subject of bargaining under the
NLRA because it is intimately related to "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment." ' 21 4 In fact, it is because of
this intimate relationship that such matters are so controversial and
2 15
are the focus of bargaining in professional sports.
3.

Third Prong of the Mackey Test
Finally, the third prong requires that there must be bona fide

arm's-length bargaining. 21 6 Essentially, it must be shown that the
§ 8(d)] includes only issues that settle an aspect of the relationship between the
employer and employees."). The court noted, "normally matters involving individuals outside the employment relationship do not fall within [the bargaining subject matter] category. .. ." Id. at 178.

212. See, e.g., Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959) (noting inadequate
rental fee was potentially destructive to employees'job security and holding rental
fee term was both integral to establishment of stable wage structure for employees
and mandatory subject of bargaining); see also Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 209-15 (1964) (holding subcontracting provision was
mandatory bargaining subject and deeming third party matter intimately relating
to employee job security was critical factor).
213. See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 59, at 407 (concluding draft
eligibility rule cannot qualify as exception based on past cases).
214. Cf Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 962 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating NBA's proposition that draft eligibility rule mandatory is bargaining subject).
215. See id. (noting court reasoned NBA draft eligibility rules were mandatory
bargaining subjects).
216. See McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1200 (6th Cir. 1979) (altering test's third prong requiring restraint rule within collective bargaining agreement to be product of vigorous collective bargaining); see, e.g., Phila. World
Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 498-500 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (noting court gave careful attention to extent of actual bargaining, matter
was inserted and "discussed," yet court ultimately refused concluding collective
bargaining product existed). The court held in this case that immunity failed for
want of "serious, intensive, arm's-length collective bargaining." Id. at 499; see also
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players' union considered the draft eligibility rule and approved of
the restraint. This requirement is difficult to determine because of
the thin line that distinguishes bargaining from discussion and
therefore should be applied only in narrowly circumscribed situations. 217 The National Labor Relations Board has barred "surface
bargaining" in the past because the only NLRA mandate is that parties bargain in good faith. 2 18 Because the unions of professional
sports have matured, and because of the uncertain nature of this
requirement, courts will often presume that if a matter appears in a
collective bargaining agreement, it is the product of arm's-length
bargaining. 2 19 Based on this presumption, the courts will most
likely conclude that the subject was the product of actual bargaining. Although Clarett argues that the rule is not an express part of
the existing collective bargaining agreement, it is not the product
of bona fide arm's-length negotiations, and therefore it should not
220
be afforded antitrust immunity under the labor exemption.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Maurice Clarett v. NationalFootballLeague,22 1 the illegal per se
standard is inappropriate because of the unique characteristics of
professional football. Therefore, the court should apply Rule of
Reason analysis in evaluating the NFL's draft eligibility rule. Under
the Rule of Reason, the draft rule's economic benefit to competition will be weighed against its economic injury to competition.
The draft eligibility rule should be deemed an unreasonable
restraint on trade because it acts to suppress competition and beRobertson v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding
labor exemption will be applied only to practices approved by union and must be
more than passive acquiescence).
217. See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 59, at 414 (noting actual bargaining requirement is "fraught with danger").
218. See, e.g., NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.
1953) (holding bad faith bargaining will not receive immunity under labor exemption). The court found that the employer bargained in bad faith based on his
conduct in a lengthy series of unsuccessful bargaining conferences. See id. at 13435. The court found that the employer's conduct demonstrated that he merely
went through the motions of negotiations as an elaborate pretense and with no
desire to reach agreement. See id.
219. See Weistart, JudicialReview of Labor Agreements: Lessons from the Sports Industry, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (1981), at 128-29 (citation omitted) ("If
parties to the disputed agreement have a long-standing and well-established bargaining relationship . . .it is difficult to imagine justification for questioning the
effectiveness of either side's consent to a particular term in a particular
negotiation.").
220. See generally Clarett Complaint, supra note 1.
221. See id.
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cause it serves no valuable economic purpose. Although the rule is
an unreasonable restraint, the labor exemption immunizes the
draft eligibility rule from antitrust laws. In applying the labor exemption, the court should find that the rule affects only parties to
the agreement, that the practice concerns a mandatory subject of
bargaining, and that the agreement is the product of bona fide
arm's-length agreement. In balancing the interests of both the NFL
and amateur players, the court should consider the goals and values
222
of each side with sensitivity.
The court's ruling has the potential to impact professional
sports and athletes in a variety of ways. 223 If the court finds that the
draft eligibility rule violates antitrust law and is an illegal restraint
on trade, professional football and college athletics may undergo a
series of changes. 224 The NFL may experience an unprecedented
influx of prospective young athletes, which in turn may force it to
22 5
develop a "farm system" to pool and develop talented players.
College football programs may be unable to retain top players to
compete, and the overall quality of competition at the collegiate
level may suffer. 226 Elimination of the rule will likely lead to a
clearer distinction between professionalism in the NFL and amateurism in college athletics.

22 7

222. See Bauer, supranote 41, at 294 (noting professional sports involve necessary on-field and off-field competition and attempts to constrain latter form of
competition requires sensitivity).
223. See Dennis Dodd, Early Exits Will Lead to One-and-Done Recruiting Nightmares, SPORTSLINE.COM, Oct. 13, 2003, at http://www.cbs.sportsline.com/collegefootball/story/6687522 (predicting that if draft eligibility rule is eliminated,
college football will become minor league football franchise, recruiting limitations
may change, and costs would change).
224. See On Merit, supra note 81 (stating commentator's opinion "football still
works in college and pros"). The commentator further argues that the elimination
of draft eligibility rules in basketball and baseball has ruined those sports. See id.
The commentator applauds the NFL's draft eligibility rule, stating "[y]ou can still
name the starting quarterback for most big college teams. You can get attached to
a guy." Id.
225. See Player ChallengingRule, supra note 7 (stating NFL has been avoiding
costs of developmental league, but if draft rule is eliminated, NFL would receive
influx young players, creating need for new minor league).
226. See Perspectives, supra note 61 (stating college football depends on emerg-

ing superstars' participation to generate money for programs). The system has
been structurally based on one major assumption - that schools will develop top
players before they attempt to play professionally. See id. "This assumption has led

to big business - the Big Ten entered into a $50.1 million television contract last
year, for example." Id. If the rule is declared invalid, college football will enter an
era of business uncertainty that may affect the allocation of funds in years to come.
See id.
227. See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 59, at 440.
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In response to an invalidation of the draft eligibility rule, the
NFL may seek legislative intervention to halt the influx of younger
players. 228 As Judge Furgeson suggested in All-Pro, Congress could
229
possibly grant an antitrust exemption to draft eligibility rules.

does
Congressional action, however, is unlikely because the issue230
action.
the
warrant
to
importance
political
not carry enough
In the most recent decision in the Clarett case, a United States
district court held that the NFL draft eligibility rule violated anti23 1 The
trust laws and declared Clarett eligible for the 2004 draft.
NFL intends to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.2 32 Final decision on the case is pending.
Shauna Itri
228. See Rosner, supra note 52, at 572.
229. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066 (C.D.
Cal. 1971); see also Rosner supra note 52, at 572 (noting Senator Arlen Specter
introduced Bill 610 in United States Senate to extend antitrust exemption to professional sports leagues for draft eligibility rules that restricted underclassmen eligibility). Bill 610 died, however, after extensive hearings. See id.
230. See Rosner, supra note 52, at 572.
231. See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, No. 03-Civ-7441 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11,
2004) (holding, as matter of law plaintiff Clarett was eligible participate in next
pending NFL's appeal), available
draft but denying issuance of stay of enforcement
744
1-stay-021104.pdf.
at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/rulings/03cvO
232. See Associated Press, judge Denies NFL's Request in 7 Clarett Case, NFL.coM,
Feb. 11, 2004, at http://www.nfl.com/news/story/708120 (noting NFL's statement regarding ruling and plans for appealing). "We continue to believe that last
week's ruling is legally erroneous and not in the best interests of the NFL, college
football, or professional and college players. We are a long way from a final decision." Id.
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